The International Journal of INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY, vol.1, no.4, (July 2005)
Iraq: the ballot box as a means of integration into the New World Order*
TAKIS FOTOPOULOS
A basic characteristic of the new era, which began with the collapse of ‘actually existing socialism’, is that integration into the New World Order (NWO) ―as expressed by the internationalised market economy― is no longer being realised through dictatorial regimes, as was the case in the 1960s and the 1970s, but through elections and ‘democracy’. The disappearance of the alternative socioeconomic system and the consequent eclipse of socialist ideology allow the transnational elite today to apply the policies of neoliberal globalisation through the ballot box, provided of course that the necessary political and, particularly, economic structures (which would prevent the political parties competing for power from even thinking of implementing different policies) have been established in advance. This ‘model’ has been applied with great success not only in Latin America but also in the countries formerly of ‘actually existing socialism’ ― today we see the integration into the NWO through the ballot box even of the USSR’s constituent parts (Georgia, Ukraine etc).
Τhe problem, however, which the transnational elite (managing the NWO) faced at the beginning of the last decade was how to achieve the integration, through the ballot box, of the Arab countries into that Order. Particularly so, since these countries happened to play a crucial role in the internationalised market economy because of their energy reserves on which the dynamics of the present growth economy depend. The problem was created in the first instance because, at the time of the emergence of the NWO, an idiomorphic new current was flourishing in these countries. This new current was based on a mixture of Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ and the ideology of anti-Western national liberation that created the unifying element which could inspire the resistance against the NWO in the area. It was this new current which led to the overthrow of the West’s protectorate in Iran, in 1979, forcing the West to support the national liberation Baathist regime in Iraq with the aim of intercepting the ayatollahs’ rise. It was this same current also which led to the rise of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, initially supported by the West in its fight against the Soviet block, but to be subjected later to an invasion by the transnational elite’s armies, under the pretext of the war against ‘terrorism’. A similar current began developing in Iraq after the invasion and barbarous occupation of the country, leading to a mass guerrilla movement last April uniting Shias and Sunnis against the occupiers and threatening to destroy the NWO, which had been carefully organised by the transnational elite through the first war in the Gulf, the crushing embargo that followed it and the invasion and occupation of Iraq.[1]
Setting the electoral process in motion was necessary for the occupying powers to break this dangerous resistance front, following a systematic attempt to crush militarily the ‘extremist’ elements which expressed the new current in Iraq, i.e. Moqtada al-Sadr's Shias, Falluja’s Sunnis et al. So, the field now lay open for the tribal divisions, which historically divided the Iraqi people, to manifest themselves ―divisions which had nothing to do with this new current. Ayatollah al-Sistani’s ‘moderate’ Shias play a leading role in this new “unholy alliance”. The contrast between Sistani and his historical counterpart in Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini, could not be wider. Khomeini demanded not just the overthrow of the Western stooge Shah with the aim of establishing a theocratically ruled Islamic state, but also adopted the demands of the Iranian national liberation movement against Western dominance. Sistani, on the other hand, not only never supported the Iraqi people’s resistance against the occupiers, but he also co-operated with the British in Basra, so that the religious parties he supported could gain local power. No wonder that today “shadowy Islamist forces acting for them have been assassinating opposition politicians, burning shops selling alcohol, and forcing women to wear the veil”.[2] At the same time, Sistani has co-operated with the US, lobbied forcefully for elections and even indirectly supported the massacre at Falluja.[3] An equally significant role in this alliance is played by the Kurd nationalists of Talabani and Barzani, whose demands are purely autonomist and have nothing to do with the national liberation demands of PKK’s Ocalan —a movement which the transnational elite took care to smash before it embarked on the process of fully integrating Iraq into the NWO![4]
It is, therefore, clear that the elections in Iraq, contrary to the fairy tales of the NWO’s commissars (like the apologist of all the transnational elite’s wars Michael Ignatieff, who even had the nerve to call the Iraqis resisting the brutal occupation ‘fascists’![5]), and contrary to similar tales from the mass media controlled by the transnational elite ―including their ‘progressive’ branch (e.g. Guardian, Observer etc) which also celebrated the supposed victory for democracy― had nothing to do with democracy and freedom. Real democracy can only be conquered through the people’s struggle; it can never be imposed by conquerors who tailor it to suit their own needs, as is the case in Iraq, where the basic economic structures have already been predetermined by the occupying powers —something which implies that the parameters of any future decisions to be made by the ‘elected’ government have been set, as Iraq has already been transformed into a huge free trade zone.[6]
The Iraqi elections, therefore, were solely aimed at breaking up the emerging popular front against the occupiers and establishing an informal protectorate which would secure Iraq’s integration into the NWO. However, Iraq’s conquerors know very well that this protectorate could not rely for its survival on the traditional Iraqi tribal divisions alone, which are bound to fade out in the future and take on a class-based character ―as long as the inequalities of neoliberal globalisation keep growing― and it is becoming obvious that the transnational elite’s army will never withdraw completely, despite the deceptive promises of Sistani, Barzani and co. It is clear that the aim of the transnational elite is simply to reduce as far as possible its very costly presence through the Iraqisation of the war, i.e. through the delegation of the suppression of resistance to the protectorate’s government. Still, the government itself will have no other option but to rely, in the last instance, on the transnational elite’s army —something that could go a long way in explaining the current construction of huge military bases in Iraq. Similarly, the present Iranian regime is also well aware that, unless it ‘adjusts’ to the new conditions imposed in the area by the NWO, it faces the same fate as the Baathists in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
* This is a translation of an article that was first published in the fortnight column of Takis Fotopoulos in the mass circulation Athens daily Eleftherotypiα on 5/2/2005
[1] See T. Fotopoulos, ‘Iraq: the new criminal 'war' of the transnational elite’, Democracy & Nature, Vol. 9, No. 2 (July 2003)
[2] Jonathan Steele, ‘Basra intellectuals united by fear of rise in religious intolerance in Basra’, The Guardian (1/2/2005)
[3] A soldier of the New Iraqi Army was photographed showing a picture of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, after a training session at a base near the city of Falluja in western Iraq (news - web sites) , November 5, 2004. REUTERS/Eliana Aponte,
[4] see T. Fotopoulos, ‘Iraq: The New Criminal “War” of the Transnational Elite
[5] Michael Ignatieff, ‘Iraqis fight a lonely battle for democracy’, Observer (30/1/2005).
[6] see on the privatisation of Iraq, Naomi Klein, ‘Bomb before you buy- What is being planned in Iraq is not reconstruction but robbery’, The Guardian (14/4/2003) and Kamil Mahdi ‘Privatisation won't make you popular’, The Guardian (26/11/2003).