The International Journal
of INCLUSIVE
DEMOCRACY, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 2010)
Direct Democracy and De-Growth*
TAKIS FOTOPOULOS
I think that in order to give a relatively
comprehensive answer
―as far, of course as time restrictions allow it―
to the driving
question of this working group, we have to ask first some
more questions and try to answer them. So, I will structure
my paper in terms of four questions, which correspond also
to four crucial issues relating to de-growth.
1. Is Democracy just a procedure?
At the outset, I think that the very form of the driving question for
this working group, as well as the
list for the other working groups and their driving questions, gives the
clear impression that democracy is one particular “box”
referring to the political side of de-growth, the other
boxes being the economic one, the technological one, the
ecological one and so on. In other words, I feel that this
classification is not just taxonomic aiming at a systematic
covering of the parts of a common whole, but reflects an
underlying assumption that democracy is just a procedure, a
good way of sorting out problems with as much participation
as possible. This may also be the reason why direct
democracy is confused with participatory democracy in the
very title of this working group.
However, as it has been shown in the
literature, democracy is not just a procedure but, instead,
it is a politeia, i.e., “a
regime aspiring to social and personal autonomy (to set your
own rules)”.[1] This means that
there is only one form of democracy at the political level,
that is, the direct exercise of sovereignty by the people
themselves, a form of societal institution which rejects any
form of “ruling” and institutionalises the equal sharing of
political power among all citizens. This fact has two
important implications:
a)
that all other forms of so-called democracy (“representative,”
“parliamentary,” etc.) are merely various forms of “oligarchy,” that is, rule by the few. Therefore,
the only adjectives that are permissible to precede
democracy are those which are used to extend its scope to
take into account democracy at the economic, or broader
social domains —as we do with the conception of Inclusive
Democracy, with its four main components of Political
Democracy, Economic Democracy, Democracy at the social realm
and Ecological Democracy aiming at integrating society to
polity, economy and Nature correspondingly;
b)
that the
real meaning of the arguments in favour of
“deepening” democracy, in the guise of various forms
of “participatory democracy,” is, at best, to give the false
impression that a kind of pseudo-direct democracy, i.e. a
mix of representative democracy with direct democracy, is
possible, (despite the fact that they represent different
types of regimes), or, at worst, to create a false image
that the present regimes in the West (which have aptly been
characterised as “liberal oligarchies”), are in fact
democratic.
2. Is De-growth compatible with a globalised market economy?
The issue whether de-growth is compatible with a market
economy, let alone a globalised one, is both a historical
and a theoretical one, in other words, it is a matter of
History and study of the dynamics of the system of the
market economy.
Historically, the growth economy is not just the outcome of
domination of specific imaginary significations or values,
but, instead, the outcome of social struggle on the one hand
and technological (including organisational) and
socio-economic developments on the other. Therefore, the
rise of the growth economy and society, let alone the rise
of bourgeois society itself, cannot simply be reduced to the
emergence of the Enlightenment idea of Progress and the
consequent rise of the imaginary of development. The
question is: has there ever been a system of market economy,
in the Polanyian sense, whose dynamic had not led to
maximisation of economic growth —barring the periods of
unwanted economic crises like the present one— whether this
was a capitalist market economy, or even a “socialist”
market economy like the one in today’s China? If the answer
is negative —as it should be— then this is a strong
indication that de-growth could not be seen as just a matter
of changing values and imaginary significations, or of
“abandoning a faith system, a religion”[2], and that,
instead, de-growth is simply non-feasible within a system of
market economy.
Theoretically, it can be shown that, on the production side,
the dynamics of the market economy lead to a constant
expansion of production, for efficiency and profits to be
maximised.[3]
Also, on the consumption side, it is well known that for
most people the rationale of the market and growth economy
is their offspring: the consumer society. It is, therefore,
obvious that a degrowing market-based economy and society is
non-feasible not only because de-growth deprives it from its
basic dynamics on the production side, but also because it
deprives it from its justification in the eyes of citizens,
who, today, have been transformed into consumers.
So, a degrowing system of market economy is a contradiction
in terms, particularly so in the present globalised economy.
Not only because the present main actors in the
internationalised market economy, the Transnational
Corporations (TNCs), will never accept in practice the
downscaling of the economy and would simply move to other
areas, in case some countries in the North (or even an
entire economic bloc like the EU), attempted to adopt a
de-growth policy, but also, because the system of market
economy is simply incompatible with a degrowing system. This
means that neither the concentration of economic power nor
the ecological implications of the growth economy are
avoidable within the present institutional framework of the
internationalised market economy.
At the strategic level, this implies that the growth economy
could not be transcended through a program of reforms, like
the ones suggested by the de-growth project, or even through
radical decentralisation within the market economy
institutional framework —whether this is effected through
eco-villages, or urban villages and similar
institutions— which take for granted the system of market
economy. However, de-growth is perfectly compatible with a
new kind of economy and society beyond the present
internationalised market economy, like the ones envisaged by
the Inclusive Democracy project. And this leads us to the
next question.
3. What is the relationship
between an Inclusive Democracy and De-growth?
It can be shown that de-growth is, in a sense, a
by-product of an Inclusive Democracy. By Inclusive Democracy
is meant the set of structures and relations, and the
corresponding values, which is based on:
a)
Political (direct) Democracy, where all
political decisions (including those relating to the
formation and implementation of laws) are taken by the
citizen body collectively and without representation;
b)
Economic Democracy,
in the sense of an economy where all production decisions
—what, how and for whom to produce— as well as consumption decisions
are taken either by the body of citizens collectively, or by
citizens individually, in an economy where the economic
resources are collectively owned and controlled by the
demos, the citizen
body, in a highly decentralised society consisting of a
confederation of self-reliant Inclusive Democracies;
c)
Democracy in the social realm, in the sense of
self-determination in work, education, etc. and,
d)
Ecological
Democracy, in the sense of a society which is re-integrated
with Nature, in the context of which a growth economy and
consumerism are things of the past. It can be shown that
every single component of an Inclusive Democracy leads to an
ecological democracy.
Thus, at the political level, there are grounds for
believing that the creation of a public space will by itself
have a very significant effect in reducing the appeal of
materialism. This is because the public space will provide a
new meaning of life to fill the existential void that the
present consumer society creates.[4]
At the economic level, it is not accidental that,
historically, the process of destroying the environment en
masse has coincided with the process of marketisation of the
economy, which began about two centuries ago. In other
words, the emergence of the market economy and of the
consequent growth economy had crucial repercussions on the
society-Nature relationship and led to the rise of the
growth ideology as the dominant social paradigm. Thus, an
“instrumentalist” view of Nature became dominant, in which
Nature was seen as an instrument for growth, within a
process of endless concentration of power. If we assume that
only a confederal society could secure an inclusive
democracy today, it would be reasonable to assume further
that once the market economy is replaced by a democratically
run confederal economy, the grow-or-die dynamics of the
former will be replaced by the new social dynamic of the
latter: a dynamic aiming at the satisfaction of
demos’ needs and
not at growth per se. If the satisfaction of demotic needs
does not depend, as at present, on the continuous expansion
of production to cover the “needs” that the market creates,
and if the link between economy and society is restored,
then there is no reason why the present instrumentalist view
of Nature will continue conditioning human behaviour.
Also, democracy in the broader social realm could be
reasonably expected to be environmentally friendly. The
phasing out of patriarchal relations in the household and
hierarchical relations in general should create a new ethos
of non-domination, which would engulf both First Nature and
Second Nature. In other words, the creation of democratic
conditions in the social realm should be a decisive step in
the creation of the sufficient condition for a harmonious
nature-society relationship.
Last but not least, the
“localist” character of a confederal Inclusive Democracy might also be expected to
enhance its environmentally friendly character. Local
control makes collective management of the commons more
effective because of the higher visibility of the commons
resources and behaviour toward them, feedback on the effect
of regulations, etc. Furthermore, it is reasonable to
assume —and the evidence about the remarkable success of
local communities in safeguarding their environments is
overwhelming[5]— that when
people rely directly on their natural surroundings for their
livelihood, they will develop an intimate knowledge of those
surroundings, which will necessarily affect positively their
behaviour towards them. However, the precondition for local
control of the environment to be successful is that the
demos depends on
its natural surroundings for its long-term livelihood and
that it therefore has a direct interest in protecting
it —another reason why an ecological society is impossible
without economic democracy. Furthermore, it should not be
forgotten that the very economic effectiveness of the
renewable forms of energy (solar, wind, etc.) depends
crucially on the organisation of social and economic life in
smaller units.
4. How to move from here to there?
On the basis of what was said before it is
clear that moving to an ecological democracy and de-growth
is not just a matter of “a paradigm shift
to a
concept of “right-sizing” the global and national economies”[6],
or just a change in culture in the form of a cultural
revolution, or a change in the legal system, etc. A change
in culture at a significant social scale is impossible
within the present institutional framework of a market
economy and its political complement of representative
democracy because the institutions themselves, and the way
of living implied by them, have created a corresponding kind
of culture. Such a change in culture at a significant social
scale can only take place
within the context of a new
political strategy that comprises the gradual involvement of
increasing numbers of people in a new kind of politics and
the parallel shifting of economic resources (labour,
capital, land) away from the market economy. The aim of such
a transitional strategy should be to create changes in the
institutional framework and
value systems that, after a period of tension between
the new institutions and the old ones,
would, at some stage, replace the market economy,
statist democracy, as well as the social paradigm
“justifying” them, with an inclusive democracy and a new
democratic paradigm respectively.[7]
This means that
activities like Community Economic Development projects,
self-managed factories, housing associations, LETS schemes,
communes, self-managed farms and so on cannot lead, by
themselves, to radical social change. However, the same
activities are necessary and desirable parts of a
comprehensive political strategy for systemic change, where
contesting local elections represents the culmination of
grassroots action. This is because contesting local
elections does provide the most effective means to massively
publicise a programme for an inclusive democracy, as well as
the opportunity to initiate its immediate implementation on
a significant social scale. In other words, contesting local
elections is not just an educational exercise but also an
expression of the belief that it is only at the local level
that direct and economic democracy can be founded today.
Therefore, participation in local elections is also a
strategy to gain power, in order to dismantle it
immediately, by substituting the decision-taking role of the
assemblies for that of the local authorities, the day after
the election is won. Finally, contesting local elections
gives the chance to start changing society from below, which
is the only democratic strategy, as against the statist
approaches, which aim to change society from above through
the conquest of state power, and the “civil society”
approaches, which do not aim to a systemic change at all. It
is because the demos
is the fundamental social and economic unit of a future
democratic society that we have to start from the local
level to change society, although of course local inclusive
democracies have to be confederated to ensure the transition
to a confederal inclusive democracy.
The immediate objective should therefore be the creation,
from below, of “popular bases of political and economic
power,” that is, the establishment of local public realms of
direct and economic democracy which, at some stage, will
confederate in order to create the conditions for the
establishment of a new society. Thus, once the institutions
of inclusive democracy begin to be installed, and people,
for the first time in their lives, start obtaining real
power to determine their own fate, then the gradual erosion
of the dominant social paradigm and of the present
institutional framework will be set in motion. A new popular
power base will be created. Town by town, city by city,
region by region will be taken away from the effective
control of the market economy and statist forms of
organisation (national or transnational), their political
and economic structures being replaced by the confederations
of democratically run communities.
To sum it up. Act locally; Aim globally.
* The above text was
used as a “stirring” paper by the working group entitled
“Participative/direct democracy” in the Second Conference
on Economic Degrowth for Ecological Sustainability and
Social Equity (Barcelona, March 26-29, 2010):
http://www.degrowth.eu/v1/uploads/media/Fotopoulous-democracy_en.pdf
[1]
Cornelius Castoriadis, “La
démocratie comme procédure et comme régime,”
La montée de
l’ insignifiance (Seuil, Paris, 1996), pp.
221-241.
[2]
Serge Latouche, “Why Less Should Be So Much More:
De-growth Economics,”
Le Monde diplomatique
(December 2004).
[3]
Takis Fotopoulos,
Towards An
Inclusive Democracy (Cassell/Taylor & Francis,
1997), ch. 1; translated in French, German,
Spanish, Italian, Greek, Chinese; see also
The Multidimensional Crisis and Inclusive Democracy (IJID, 2005), chs.
1-5 :
http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/ss/ss.htm
[4]
Kerry H. Whiteside, “Hannah Arendt and Ecological
Politics,” Environmental Ethics, Vol. 16, No.
4 (Winter 1994), p. 355.
[5] see
e.g. The Ecologist, Vol. 22, No. 4
(July-August 1992).